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ARGUMENT
Defendants, particularly Lehmer, dedicate a considerable portion oftheir briefs to
issues and arguments they failed to raise in the trial court. As to at least two of those
issues, the failure precludes appellate review.
Conversely, defendants leave unaddressed several issues and arguments Ockey
raised in the trial court andagain on appeal. For example, neither defendant addresses
Ockey's claim that title to his interest in the family ranch vested in him on termination of
his Trusts, rendering void the trustees' attempt to convey his interest eight years later.
Defendants apparently concede the point. The concession moots defendants' ratification
arguments on the quiet title claim since a void conveyance may not be ratified. See
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273, n. 7 (UtahCt.
App. 1996) (noting that "void" contracts are "incapable of confirmation or ratification.").
Defendants likewise fail to address Ockey's arguments regarding the absence of
evidence on the elements of ratification, one of the primary theories adoptedby the trial
court in dismissing Ockey's conversion claim. As noted in the points that follow, these
and defendants' other concessions should significantly narrow the scope of the Court's
review.
I. LEHMER IMPROPERLY RAISES ISSUES NEVER PRESENTED TO THE
TRIAL COURT
Lehmer's first two issues were never raised in the trial court and may not now be
considered on appeal. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d
667, 672 (Utah 1982) ("This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were not
submitted to the trial court and concerning which the trial court did not have the
opportunity to make any findings of fact or law."). Lehmer provides no citation to the
record for these issues, as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, because none exists.
As articulated by Lehmer, the first issue is "whether under the quiet title statute
one can maintain a quiet title action against a party who has never claimed title to the
subject real property...." Lehmer's Opening Brief at 2. Although Ockey's quiet title claim
was the subject of cross motions for summary judgment, Lehmer's first issue was not
raised or argued in that context.
Lehmer's second issue also addresses Ockey's quiet title claim: whether "quiet
title claims are moot where a plaintiff has acknowledged that he transferred any interest
he had to a separate company and agreed another company can retain title no matter how
the quiet title claims are adjudicated." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 2. The first part of the
issue, concerning transfer "to a separate company," was never submitted to the trial court.
Under the long-standing rule articulated in Turtle Management, these two issues and the
corresponding argument should not be considered.
II. SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF LEHMER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
Lehmer's "Statement of Facts" distorts several key facts. Many of the distortions
are used to support Lehmer's arguments and are best addressed in the context of Ockey's
response to those arguments. Several of the distortions, however, merit a direct response:
• "When Mr. Ockey turned 28 years old on September 6, 1986, his undivided
interest in the Ranch vested. At thispoint, had Mr. Ockey demanded his
portion of the Ranch be divided, then underparagraph 4.q. ofthe Trusts
the trustee would have had the option to divide the Ranch itselfor to
compensate Mr. Ockey 'in money. '"Lehmer's Opening Brief"at 9.
The record contains no evidence that the trust estates ever included "money" or
any other liquid asset. Consequently, although the trust agreements provided the
theoretical authority to distribute the principal "in money," in reality the trustees only had
the option of "granting, transferring or assigning an undivided interest..." in the Ranch.
(R. 225) The trust estates were comprised solely of undivided interests in the Ranch from
creation until termination of the Trusts.1 Nothing else was available for distribution.
• "IMAIfailed to make two $30,000 payments, somethingMr. Ockey was
aware ofin 1992." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 10.
Nothing in the record supports the claim that Ockey was aware of the missed
payments. At best, the cited testimony (TT 257-58) supports the conclusion that, on an
unidentified date, Ockey overheard Nick discussing IMAI's default. (TT 258)
• "Instead ofdeclaring a default, however, Mr. Lehmer, after Uncle Nick had
obtained consentfrom family members, decided toforgive thesepayments if
R&J would agree to pledge IMAIstock as collateralforfuture payments
...." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 10.
There is no competent evidence that "Uncle Nick had obtained consent from
family members..." for the stock pledge arrangement with Jackson and Rothwell. The
trial testimony Lehmer cites in support of the statement reads:
Q. You say that the family agreed to accept the stock as collateral. You
don't know whether Scott Ockey agreed to take the stock as collateral do
you?
In fact, eight years after termination of the Trusts, the trustees purported to convey to
IMA Ltd the only property in the trust estates, Ockey's Ranch interests.
A. It was my understanding that the entire family had been questioned and
that that's what they chose to do, yes.
Q. You never talked to Scott Ockey about that issue, did you?
A. I didn't speak with him directly about that in that matter [sic] that I
recall today.
(TT 95) The cited testimony contains no reference to "Uncle Nick." And if Lehmer had
a foundation for his "understanding," it was not based on anything he learned from
Ockey. More importantly, if Ockey was ever told of the stock pledge arrangement, it was
years later, after Lehmer made the arrangement without Ockey's consent.
• "Assuming Mr. Ockey were correct, ifanyone received Mr. Ockey's share
ofthe IMAIstock, it was Alexandra Ockey and Uncle Nick, from whom
Mr. Ockey had obtained his undivided interest in the Ranch (via the
Trusts), and who, therefore, were not lessors under the Option Agreement
to that extent." Lehmer's OpeningBrief at 13.
The claim that Alexandra Ockey and Nick received Ockey's share of the IMAI
stock is argument, not fact. Although difficult to follow, the argument is, apparently, that
since Alexandra and Nick each purchased 1/6 of the stock IMAI offered for sale in 1993,
somehow they purchased Ockey's share of the company.
The argument was not raised at the trial court, likely because it does not track with
the facts. On June 30, 1993, Lehmer took delivery of the Jackson and Rothwell stock as
a "means of transferring the ownership of [IMAI] to the various members of the Condas
Family." (R. 2995) The next day, instead of transferring ownership as promised, Lehmer
installed himself, Nick Condas and John Condas as the new directors and officers of
IMAI, canceled all existing shares without authority, then decided to sell newly issued
stock to himself, Nick , Alexandra and others. (R. 2997-3000) Nick and Alexandra
purchased newlyissuedstock, not "Ockey's share of the IMAI stock...." Id.
• "Mr. Ockey certainly was aware ofthe stock transfers by thefall of 1993
(or early 1994 at the latest), when he overheard a conversation between
Uncle Nick and Suzi Lehmer Kontgis (Grandchild) in which Uncle Nick
agreedto sell some ofhisIMAI stockto Ms. Kontgis ...." Id.
If by "the stock transfers" Lehmer is referring to the transfers made by Jackson
and Rothwell as a "means of transferring the ownership of [IMAI] to the various
members of the Condas Family...," Lehmer is confused. (R. 2995) What Ockey learned
when he overheard the conversation is that Nick owned IMAI stock. Notice that Nick
owned stock was not notice of the "stock transfers."
• "Uncle Nicktold[Ockey] to look through his stacks ofrecordsconcerning
the Ranch, IMAI, and the StateLease to satisfy any concerns he had. "
Lehmer's Opening Briefat 13.
The statement is made in support of Lehmer's argument that Ockey knew the facts
underlying his conversion claim before the three-year limitations period expired. But
there is no evidence of when Nick extended the invitation or whether the "stacks of
records" contained any information about the facts underlying the conversion claim. The
cited trial court finding only notes that "Nick directed him to all relevant records
concerning the Ranch..." (R. 4598), and the cited trial testimony establishes only that
Ockey had "full access to Nick's papers...." (TT 292)
III. QUIET TITLE AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS
Ockey's quiet title and declaratory relief claims were the subject of cross motions
for summary judgment decided by the trial court in February 2001. Ockey filed one of
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the motions and Lehmer filed the other. (R. 2311 & 2396) All defendants joined in
Lehmer's opposition to Ockey's motion, including IMAI and IMHG. (R. 2469)
Although he never raised the issue before the trial court, Lehmer now asserts he is
the "wrong defendant" with regard to the claims. He is not, apparently, the wrong
defendant to attack the claims. He does so with four distinct arguments. Each is
addressed in turn.
A. Ockey Transferred an LLC Interest to His Company, not His Claim to
His Ranch Interest.
Lehmer's first argument is that Ockey allegedly transferred his interest in the
family ranch "to his company, OK Investments." Lehmer's OpeningBrief'at 23. As
noted, this issue was waived when not raised in the trial court. See Turtle Management,
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982).
If it had been raised, Ockey would have pointed out that the only support Lehmer
offers for the argument is the language of the July 1998 settlement agreement between
Ockey and the developer of the Ranch (the "Settlement Agreement"). As characterized
by Lehmer, the relevant language is: "OK [Investments] has acquired all of Ockey's right,
title and interest in and to [the Ranch Interest]." Lehmer's OpeningBriefat 23.
The actual language of the agreement reflects the fact that Ockey was seeking
recognition of his interest in the Ranch, but he had no recognized interest to convey to
OK Investments. Instead, he had a membership interest in IMHG: "OK has acquired all
of Ockey's right, title and interest in and to IMHG as well as the IMHG Property." (R.
IMAI's brief does not address the quiet title and declaratory judgment claims.
1158) Had Lehmer raised the issue in the trial court, Ockey could have pointed out that
the claim to title necessary to maintain his quiet title claim was never transferred.
B. The Quiet Title Claim is not Moot Because Adjudication of the Claim
Will Affect Title.
Lehmer's second argument is that, by virtue of language in the Settlement
Agreement, "adjudication of the quiet title claims will have no effect on title to the Ranch
..." and, therefore, the quiet title claim is moot. Lehmer's Opening Briefat 25.
Lehmer misreads the Settlement Agreement. The agreement anticipates Ockey
prevailing on his quiet title claim and being "vested with and/or entitled to become vested
with equitable or legal title to any part or all of the IMHG property, in his own right, and
not as a partner of IMA, Ltd. or member of IMHG ...." (R. 1159) Ockey agreed that, if he
prevails on his quiet title claim, he will "sell to IMA all of [his] right, title and interest in
..."the Ranch, but not before acquiring title himself. (R. 1162)
Adjudication of the quiet title claim will affect title because it will vest title in
Ockey. The effect may not be long-lasting, but Lehmer cites no authority mandating an
effect on title meeting a minimum temporal requirement. The claim is not moot.3
C. The Trustees' Authority Before Termination of the Trusts has no
Impact on the Post-termination Quiet Title Claim.
Lehmer's third argument is another that was not presented to the trial court. He
argues that because Ockey "was not guaranteed he would receive title to a portion of the
J Lehmer's mootness argument also ignores the other Settlement Agreement benefits
Ockey receives if he prevails on the quiet title claim, such as the right "to have a proposal
submitted to ASC Utah" by which certain proceeds owed by ASC Utah would be paid to
Ockey "in a different way than the others in IMHG...," including Lehmer. (R. 1163)
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Ranch ... he cannot maintain a quiet title action." Lehmer's Opening Brief at 24. Had
Lehmerraised the argument, Ockey would have countered that his quiet title claim is not
based on a guarantee found in the Trusts. Rather, it is based on the legal consequence of
the Trusts' termination. As noted in Ockey's opening brief, when the Trusts terminated,
the remaining estate of the trustees also terminated, leaving Ockey with both equitable
and legal title to the Ranch interests, the only assets in the Trusts.4
D. Ockey Did not Ratify the Trustees' Attempted Conveyances.
Lehmer's final argument on the quiet title claim is the only argument accepted by
the trial court in granting Lehmer's summaryjudgment motion: that Ockey ratified the
trustees' "conveyances" of his Ranch interests. (R. 3747) The argument is that Ockey
accepted "millions of dollars in benefits after knowing the benefits were made possible
by the conveyance he now claims was defective (or even void)." Lehmer's Opening Brief
at 27.
The first problem with the argument is its factual premise is unfounded. Nothing
in the record establishes that the benefit Ockey received was "made possible" by the
conveyance of his Ranch interest. Lehmer offers no supporting cite; he simply assumes
that Ockey would not have received "millions of dollars in benefits" if the trustees had
conveyed the Ranch interest to Ockey as required by the Trusts and the law. Lehmer's
assumption fails to account for the other possibilities, including the possibility that, given
control of his interest, Ockey might have derived substantially more benefit than what he
See Ockey's Opening Briefat 13-15.
received under the current development scheme. Regardless ofthe possibilities, the
argument fails for lack of factual support.
Next, Lehmer argues "Mr. Ockey's 1994 conveyance does not require ratification,
as there is no evidence Mr. Ockey would have made any different decision concerning
the transfer of the Ranch Interest to IMALTD in 1994." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 27.
The argument is legally and factually flawed.
First, the notion that we are dealing with "Mr. Ockey's 1994 conveyance" is, of
course, wrong. The conveyance was made by Ellen Bayas and Nick Condaspurporting
to act as Ockey's trustees eight years after the Trusts terminated. (R. 2676) The fact that
Ockeysigned a document titled "Directive to Convey Trust Property" changes nothing.
(R. 2426) By the document, Ockey, as "beneficiary ...," directed "the trustee of the Trust
to convey the entire undivided ownership interest held by the Trust in ..." the Ranch. Id.
At the time, however, Ockey was no longer a beneficiary under the Trusts and the
trustees had nothing to convey. The Trusts had terminated and the attempted 1994
conveyances were voidab initio.5
5This is the first pointof Ockey's opening brief. As noted, Defendants apparently
concede the point. One likely reason for the concession is that arguing the point would
draw attention to one of Lehmer's early failures as a fiduciary. Ockey did not know the
truth regarding the trustees' lack of authority but Lehmer did. In May 1989, Lehmer was
negotiating with Tom Clyde, counsel for Jackson and Rothwell, when he received a letter
from Mr. Clyde addressing defects in title to the Ranch. One of the defects was created
by the fact that certain trustees, including Ockey's, had executed documents after the
trusts' termination dates. As Mr. Clyde put it: "There is a concern that the trusts should
have distributed to the beneficiaries, and as a result, the signatures of the trustees are
subject to challenge." (R. 3012)
The argument fairs no better as a legal proposition. The argument is that an
unauthorized act is deemed authorized absent evidence that the principal would have
acted differently given the chance. Lehmer cites nothing in support of the proposition
and Ockey is aware of no supporting law.
Lehmer's final ratification argument —regarding the effect of the Settlement
Agreement ~ is the only ratification argument he made in support of his summary
judgment motion. He asserts that through the Settlement Agreement"Ockey ratified any
defect in the conveyance ..." of his Ranch interests. Lehmer's Opening Briefat 28, As
noted in Ockey's opening brief, however, a void conveyance cannot be ratified. Lehmer
ignores the point, but it is dispositive. The conveyances were void ab initio and could not
be ratified four years later even if Ockey intended to ratify them.
If Ockey could ratify a void conveyance, he did not do it by settling with the
developer. Ockey settled with the developer to allow the development to proceed
(R. 1157-58) In doing so, however, he made clear his intent to not ratify the 1994
conveyances. Instead of affirming the conveyances, he affirmed his intent to attack the
conveyances through his quiet title and declaratory relief claims, claims that are
indisputably reserved in the Settlement Agreement. The void conveyances were not
ratified by operation of the Settlement Agreement.
IV. CONVERSION AND FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS
IMAI and Lehmer both address the trial court's handling of the conversion claim at
trial. But neither addresses the trial court's handling of the claim in response to Ockey's
earlier summary judgment motion. As argued in Ockey's opening brief, the motion was
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legally and factually sound and should have been granted.6 Defendants concede the point
by failing to address it.
Defendants' concession should be dispositive. Ifthe Court concludes otherwise,
however, none ofdefendants' arguments effectively supports the trial court's erroneous
handling of the claim, or its handling ofthe fiduciary duty claim.
A. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding it Could not Fashion an
Equitable Remedy for Lehmer's Breach and Conversion.
Acting as Ockey's agent pursuant to a written power of attorney, Lehmer took
delivery of the Jackson and Rothwell stock as a "means oftransferring ownership of
[IMAI] to..." Ockey and the other members of the extended family. (R. 2995) When
Lehmer surrendered the stock to IMAI for cancellation without first ensuring new stock
would be issued to Ockey in proportion to his ownership interest, he deprived Ockey of
his share of the stock. The act of surrendering the stock to IMAI was both a breach of
Lehmer's fiduciary duty to Ockeyand conversion of Ockey's share of the stock.
Lehmer does not argue otherwise. He does not defend his conduct; rather, he
argues that he is effectively insulated from liability because Ockey has no equitable
remedy against him. Lehmer points to the trial court conclusion that it could not force
Lehmer to convey a portion of his 23% ownership interest in IMAI to Ockey because
doing so would be awarding "damages in the disguise of equity ...." (TT 1043)
See Ockey's opening brief at 19-22.
7The court first concluded Ockey has no adequate remedy at law. (R. 4603; TT 1020)
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As Ockey pointed out in his opening brief, the error in the analysis lies in its
characterization of stock. A certificate of stock is "written acknowledgment by the
corporation of the interest of a shareholder in the corporate property ...." 1 William M.
Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia ofthe Law ofPrivate Corporations §5091 (perm. ed. rev.
vol. 1986). A stock certificate is merely evidence of ownership. See Owyhee, Inc. v.
Robbins Marco Polo, 407 P.2d 565, 567 (Utah 1965) ("the certificate is not the stock
itself, but is merely the evidence of stock ownership."); see also Utah Code Ann.
§16-10a-625(l)(l992) ("Shares may but need not be represented by certificates.").
The trial court reached its "no remedy" conclusion because it could not get past a
conceptual barrier posed by two facts. The first is that Lehmer no longer has the stock he
received from Jackson and Rothwell. As stated by the trial court:
The stock originally received from Jackson and Rothwell no longer exists.
Lehmer does not possess any such shares and, therefore, the allegedly
converted property cannot be returned. Because Lehmer does not possess
the allegedly converted property, return of the stock by Lehmer as an
equitable remedy is not available to [Ockey].
(R. 4604) The fact that the Jackson and Rothwell stock "no longer exists" is not pertinent
to the conversion analysis. Certainly, Ockey would have no claim if Lehmer had
surrendered the stock to the corporation for cancellation and reissuance ofnew
certificates, including one to Ockey representing a 13.89% interest in the company.
Under this scenario, the fact remains that the "stock originally received from Jackson and
Rothwell no longer exists...." (R. 4604) But no one would claim the stock was
converted.
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What is pertinent to the analysis is what the stock certificates represented:
Ockey's and the other family members' ownership interests in IMAI. By surrendering
the stock certificates to the corporation for cancellation without first ensuring the
corporation would issue Ockey a new certificate for 13.89% ofthe company's stock,
Lehmer dispossessed Ockey of his 13.89% stake in the company.
The trial court's analysis also hung up on its related idea that the IMAI stock
Lehmer now owns is "different from" the stock he converted. As the court put it in
discourse with Ockey's counsel: "I don't think there is evidence in this case that today
John Lehmer is holding your client's stock." (TT 1048) But identifying to whom stock
certificates are issued does not address the question. Lehmer dispossessed Ockey of his
ownership interest in the company and he has the means to restore it.
Under the trial court's analysis, the only scenario under which Ockey would have a
remedy for Lehmer's malfeasance is if Lehmer had retained the Jackson and Rothwell
stockcertificates. Under this scenario, he would be "holding" Ockey's stock and,
presumably, could be ordered to return it. But by "surrendering" the stock certificates to
the company and then voting as a self-appointed director to cancel the stock certificates,
Lehmereffectively made himselfjudgmentproof under the trial court's analysis.
The error in the trial court's reasoning is further highlighted by its concession that,
but for the statute of limitations, IMAI could be forced to issue stock to Ockey. (TT
1044) Conceptually, ordering IMAI to restore Ockey's ownership interest is no different
from ordering Lehmer to do so. Assuming IMAI uses treasury stock to restore the
interest (the only reasonable option since issuing new stockwould dilute existing
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shareholders' interests), in both cases the defendant is conveying an ownership interest
held by it. No legal or factual impediment precludes the equitable remedy Ockey seeks
from Lehmer.
B. The IMAI Stock Value Increase Does not Preclude an Equitable
Remedy.
Lehmer complains that the interest in IMAI Ockey seeks to recover is more
valuable than the interest he would have received but for Lehmer's misconduct. Of
course, had Lehmer not dispossessed Ockey of his interest in 1993, Lehmer would have
no cause to complain that Ockey seeks stock worth more than its 1993 value. In other
words, Lehmer has no one to blame but himself for the possibility that Ockey may now
recover stock worth more than it was worth when converted.
Lehmer's reference to the "New York rule" ignores the trial court's finding that the
IMAI stock could not be valued as of the date of conversion (or any other relevant date),
leaving Ockey with no adequate remedy at law. (R. 4603; TT 1020) As Lehmer
concedes, the New York rule is not applicable given the trial court's ruling:
Only where damages cannot be determined, and therefore a remedy at law
is unavailable, may a plaintiff recover stock, and then because it is the only
way to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.
Lehmer's Opening Briefat 37. Here, a remedy at law it is unavailable and the only way
to compensate Ockey for Lehmer's breach of fiduciary duty and conversion is to compel
Lehmer to provide Ockey his 13.89% interest in IMAI.
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C. Nick Condas's Statements are Inadmissible Hearsay.
Specifically addressing the fiduciary duty claim, Lehmer argues he "fulfilled any
fiduciary duty he had to Mr. Ockey by first consulting with Uncle Nick before ..."
dispossessing Ockey of his share of the IMAI stock. Lehmer's Opening Briefat 45. He
claims, as he did at trial, thatNick told him the "family" consented to canceling the
Jackson and Rothwell stock. Id. Whathe does not claim is that Ockey consented to
canceling the stock. Lehmer owed the fiduciary duty to Ockey andonly by securing
Ockey's consent was Lehmer free to cancel Ockey's stock.
Moreover, whatever Nick might have told Lehmer regarding "family" consent was
inadmissiblehearsay. Lehmer argues Nick's statements are not hearsay because they
were not offered for their truth "but instead merely to show Mr. Lehmer's state of mind
when deciding what to do with the IMAI stock." Id. at 46. Lehmer never explains what
his "state of mind" has to do with his fiduciary obligation to ensure Ockey received his
share of the IMAI stock. Without this explanation, Lehmer's argument renders the
hearsay statements immaterial.9
The admissibility of Nick's alleged statements to Lehmer was the subject of Lehmer's
pretrial motion in limine. (R. 4294) Over Ockey's objection, the trial court granted the
motion before the start of trial. For unknown reasons, the trial court's order does not
appear in the record. Lehmer's appellate counsel now claims that his motion in limine
"apparently was never ruled upon...." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 46, fn 13. As Ockey
noted in his opening brief, the motion was granted and Ockey is in the process of
securing from Lehmer's trial counsel a written stipulation regarding the matter.
In another footnote, Lehmer raises for the first time a claim that Nick had "apparent
authority" to communicate Ockey's consent to the conversion. Lehmer's Opening Brief
at 46, fn 14. The claim was waived when not raised in the trial court. If it had been
15
D. Ockey Never Ratified the Conversion of His Stock.
The trial court's conclusion that Ockey ratified the stock conversion is inconsistent
with the law. Among other elements, the law requires that the ratified act be done on
behalf of the principal. See Restatement (Second) ofAgency §82 (1958). Defendants do
not even suggest that cancellation of the stock was done on behalf of Ockey.
Defendants do not address this legal deficiency, or any of the other missing
ratification elements noted in Ockey's opening brief. Instead, they support their argument
with three contentions that find no support in the record. The first is that development of
the ranch was "made possible by Mr. Lehmer maintaining the State Lease in 1993."
Lehmer's OpeningBrief"at 47. No one disputes that the State Lease lands added value to
the development, but the amount of that value and the prospects for the development
without the State Lease are simply not known. There is no evidence that development of
the Ranch was "made possible by Mr. Lehmer maintaining the State Lease in 1993." Id.
The second unsupported contention is pure speculation: "Had IMAI simply
distributed the stock in proportion to ownership interest in the Ranch... it could not have
raised the $6,000 needed to maintain the State Lease...." Id. at 48.10 The assertion,
offered as an excuse for defendants' conduct, has no legal or factual basis. Nothing
(continued) raised, it would find no support in the record, a fact highlighted by the
complete lack of any citation of the record in the footnote Lehmer uses to raise the claim.
1 IMAI makes the same claim, buttries to tie it to the trial court's findings: "[Ockey's
argument] is contrary to the trial court's specific findings of fact that without the ability to
use IMAI stock to fund the State Lease and pursue development, there would not have
been any lot sale proceeds because the development would not have happened." IMAI's
Brief at 9. IMAI offers no cite to the "trial court's specific findings of fact..." on the
point because they do not exist.
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precluded Lehmer and IMAI from both distributing the stock in proportion to Ranch
ownership and issuing new stock for sale. Lehmer acknowledged as much at trial. He
testified it was "possible" to "issue the original 5000 shares to the family members in
proportion to their interest in the ranch and then sell the new stock to those who wanted
to buy it." (TT 157; see also TT 150) He was skeptical about IMAI's ability to sell
newly issued stock, but he conceded "[w]e could have handed out the stock to all of the
people who owned the land ...." (TT 146) Canceling the Rothwell and Jackson stock was
not a precondition to later stock sales.
Finally, the notion that Ockey ratified the conversion of his stock by accepting
money from the Ranch development ignores the fact that the money was paid to him
solely on account of his membership interest in IMHG. Ockey received 13.89% of that
part of the development proceeds distributed by the developer to IMHG. These proceeds
have nothing to do with IMAI. If Ockey's ownership interest in IMAI had not been
converted, he also would have received a portion of the development proceeds distributed
by the developer to IMAI.11
In discussion regarding the amount Ockey received from development of the Ranch,
Lehmer and IMAI repeatedly feature a theme that they also raised at trial: that Ockey's
family made him rich. The idea is a tacit "end justifies the means" argument that fails to
account for the law. Defendants' conduct is not measured by the degree to which they
made Ockey rich. Rather, it is measured by the law and the law does not vary with the
amount Ockey received on account ofhis interest in the Ranch. The other problem with
the theme is nothing in the record supports it. No evidence exists that the "[family's]
decisions concerning the development of [the] family ranch..." had anything to do with
the amount Ockey received on account of his interest in the Ranch. Lehmer's Opening
Briefat 1.
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E. Ockey had Preemptive Rights in all Issued IMAI Stock.
Ockey's summaryjudgment motion on the conversion claim addressed as a
separate matter the question of whether Ockey had preemptive rights. The idea was to
first establish Ockey as an IMAI shareholder by prevailing on the conversion claim and
then establish Ockey's shareholder preemptive rights in connection with all shares issued
by IMAI, not just those issued for cash. After the trial court ruled in favor of Ockey on
the preemptive rights issue, defendants moved for reconsideration and the court reversed
itself. (R. 4549)
In opposing Ockey's motion, defendants argued Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-630
(1992) applied retroactively to limit the preemptive rights otherwise allowed by IMAI's
1992 articles of incorporation. Lehmer now retracts the argument and instead asserts that
when stock was issued for services in 1995, section 16-10a-630 applied because it was
"the law" in Utah. The argument is based on section 7 of IMAI's 1992 articles, which
Lehmer quotes as: "[shareholders will have preemptive rights in the corporation as
provided by law." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 38. By limiting the quote to this single
phrase, Lehmer avoids addressing the impact of the rest of section 7, which reads:
Preemptive Rights. Shareholders will have preemptive rights in the
corporation as provided by law in the event that any additional shares are
authorized and issued, so their relative ownership of the corporation's
shares remains unchanged if the shareholder exercises his or her preemptive
rights. This shall specifically require the corporation to extend the offer to
purchase additional shares to the shareholders of each class of stock, so
they may preserve their percentage interest in the corporation as a whole....
(R. 3017-20) (emphasis added). All IMAI stock was issued under the preemptive rights
language of section 7, language that extends preemptive rights to "any" stock issue.
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If the operative statute is section 16-lOa-630 as Lehmer claims, the express
exception to the section's limitation on preemptive rights applies. The exception
abrogates the limitation if the articles "expressly provide [for no limit] ...." Utah Code
Ann. §16-10a-630(2). Section 7 of IMAI's articles does just that by allowing
shareholders unlimited preemptive rights. The limitation Lehmer relies on is
inapplicable.
Referring to the 1995 amendment to IMAI's articles, which refers specifically to
preemptive rights in shares issued as compensation for services, Lehmer argues "between
1993 and 1995, no IMAI shareholders exercised preemptive rights to purchase stock
when new stock was issued [for] services ... because they had none until the amendment
created them." Lehmer 's OpeningBriefat 39. There is no evidence that between 1993
and 1995 IMAI interpreted the law in a manner Lehmer advocates. The more likely
scenario is that "no IMAI shareholders exercised preemptive rights to purchase stock
when new stock was issued [for] services..." because the corporation never bothered to
offer the preemptive rights.
The trial court's original ruling on this issue granting Ockey's motion for summary
judgment was correct. (R. 4525) By reversing itself in response to Lehmer's motion to
reconsider, the trial court committed error. (R. 4548)
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Ockey Neither Knew nor had Reason to Know of the Conversion.
The first question pertinent to the statute of limitations issue is did Ockey know or
have reason to know of the events giving rise to his conversion claim within the
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limitations period. Defendants'analysis of the question ignores the relevant events. All
of the events giving rise to the claim occurred on July 1, 1993, the day Lehmer "delivered
and transferred [the stock] to the Company for cancellation." (R. 2995)
Rather than addressing the events of July 1, 1993, defendants focus on IMAI's
sale of stock to various family members over the following two years. For example,
Lehmer claims the "best evidence" of Ockey's knowledge of the events underlying his
conversion claim "is Mr. Ockey's testimony that he knew about IMAI's practice of
issuing stock for services in 1995 ...." Lehmer's Opening Briefat 41. Lehmer explains
that Ockey's knowledge of stock issued for services "demonstrates Mr. Ockey knew
before June 1996 that others -- including his own mother - had the IMAI stock he claims
should have gone to him." Id. at 42. Ockey has never claimed that the stock purchased
by or issued for services to others is rightfully his. And before early 1997, Ockey did not
even know that there ever existed IMAI stock that "should have gone to him." Id.
The date Ockey learned that IMAI stock existed that should have gone to him is
the critical issue and defendants fail to address it. What they do address is simply not
pertinent to the statute of limitations analysis. For example, Lehmer never explains how
the "best evidence" he cites ~ IMAI's practice of issuing stock for services in 1995 ~
gave Ockey reason to know of the conversion two years earlier.
Next, both defendants argue Ockey "failed to marshal his own testimony
indicating he knew [about the stock transfers] in 1995...." Id. Lehmer supports the
argument with references to the trial testimony Ockey allegedly failed to marshal. Id.
Lehmer misreads Ockey's brief. Each reference to stock transfers Lehmer cites is also
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cited by Ockey. Any differences in the citations are matters of characterization. For
example, the first piece of testimony Lehmer claims Ockey missed is: "by 1995, [Ockey]
knew that J&R had gone into default and delivered the IMAI stock to Mr. Lehmer.
(R. TT:256)" Id. Ockey cites the same testimony on page 37 of his opening brief as
follows: "The trial court also considered Ockey's testimony that places his knowledge of
the family's IMAI stock acquisition at a point in time that is likely less than three years
after the acquisition. (TT 256)" The actual trial testimony involved cross-examination
using Ockey's deposition transcript:
Q Question, "In the 1993 did you know that Jackson and Rothwell had
gone into default and the family would be acquiring their stock in IMAI?"
A My answer was "No, not until some later date, a later date."
Q Question, "Do you recall how much later?"
A Answer, "Probably at least a year maybe more."
Q So, you did know that Jackson and Rothwell has [sic] defaulted in
1993 or perhaps a year later, correct?
A To the best ofmy knowledge, yes.
(TT 256)
Lehmer next mischaracterizes Alexandra Ockey's trial testimony. He claims that
between "June 1993 and January 1994 ... Alexandra Ockey, discussed 'what was going
on at the Ranch' with Mr. Ockey, causing her to believe Mr. Ockey knew about the IMAI
stock cancellation before June 1996. (R. TT: 569.)" Lehmer's Opening Brief at 42.
Ockey cites the same testimony on page 33 of his opening brief as follows: "Alexandra
Ockey testified that prior to 1989 her "recollection is that... [Scott] understood what was
21
going on..." at the ranch. (TT 569) Consistent with Ockey's characterization, the actual
trial testimony says nothing about IMAI stock or the dates Lehmerreferences. (TT 569)
Again, the question is whether Ockey knew or had reason to know of the events
giving rise to the conversion claim within the limitations period. Defendants agree that
the issue is appropriatelyviewed in the larger context of what was happening with the
Ranch development at the time. But they fail to acknowledge that part of the relevant
context is Ockey's justified belief that he had no ability to control or possess his Ranch
interest because it was still held in trust. The belief was fostered by Lehmer. For
example, the power of attorney Lehmer used to take delivery of Ockey's share of the
Jackson and Rothwell stock states that the Trusts still held Ockey's Ranch interest.12
Lehmer knew Ockey's power of attorney was perpetuating a fraud regarding the
Trusts' continuing control over Ockey's Ranch interest. Years earlier, Lehmer had
communicated with Tom Clyde, counsel for Jackson and Rothwell, concerning the fact
that the corpus of Ockey's Trusts should have been distributed to him. (R. 3011-13)
Despite the fiduciary duties he owed Ockey, Lehmer said nothing.
Six months after Lehmer took delivery of the stock, the truth was still being
withheld when several family members, including Ockey, were asked to sign a document
titled "Directive to ConveyTrust Property." (R. 2426) By the document, Ockeyand the
Referring to Ockey's interest in the Ranch, the power of attorney states: "[t]he land of
which I am a tenant in common owner ... is described in Exhibit A hereto (the
"Property"), along with a description of my present ownership interest." (R. 3452)
Ockey's "present ownership interest" is described on Exhibit A as a beneficiary interest
under the Trusts. (R. 3456)
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others, each as "beneficiary," directed "the trustee[s] ofthe Trust[s] to convey the entire
undivided [Ranch] ownership interest held by the Trust[s] ...." Id. Pursuant to the
directive, Ockey's trustees purported to convey his Ranch interest to IMA Ltd. in January
1994. By all appearances, the result of the conveyance was Ockey no longer had a
beneficial interest in the Ranch property but instead a future personal property interest in
a limit partnership.
The important point for presentpurposes is that, even if Ockey had been told in
1994 that the family acquired the Jackson and Rothwell stock, he would have no reason
to know that a portion of the stockshouldhave been distributed to him. At best, he
would have reason to believe that his trustees acquired a portion to be held in trust.
Finally, the issue must be viewed in light of the fact that, prior to the conversion,
Ockey signed a power of attorney appointing Lehmer, his first cousin and a practicing
attorney, to look after his interests, whatever they might be. Under these circumstances,
if Ockey was less attentive than the law demands (a conclusion not supported by the
record), his neglect does not excuse defendants' intentional misconduct.
B. Defendants Concealed the Events Relevant to the Conversion Claim.
Like the analysis regarding Ockey's knowledge, Defendants avoid the germane
concealment analysis by focusing on who owned IMAI stock rather than focusing on the
July 1, 1993 conversion events. For example, Lehmer begins this point ofhis brief as
follows: "Mr. Ockey's attempt to invoke the concealment version of the discovery rule
also fails because there is no evidence Mr. Lehmer, or anyone else, concealed the fact
family members other than Mr. Ockey owned the IMAI stock." Lehmer's Opening Brief
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at 44. Ockey has never claimed anyone concealed the fact family members own stock.
The point is irrelevant.
Lehmer understands that the relevant question is whether the July 1, 1993 events
were concealed. Thus, he asserts that he, "along with John Condas and Nick Condas,
circulated minutes of a July 1, 1993 IMAI shareholders meeting describing precisely
what they had done." Id. The record contains no evidence that the minutes were
"circulated." In fact, all of the evidence is to the contrary. In his openingbrief, Ockey
detailed the trial testimony ofevery family member who addressed the issue.13 They
unanimously testified they knew nothing about the events of July 1,1993. Defendants do
not address their testimony or any other aspect of Ockey's argument on the concealment
version of the discovery rule. The rule should have operated to toll the conversion statute
of limitations and the trial court's contrary conclusion was error.
VI. LEHMER'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO
HIS CROSS-APPEAL MANDATES DISMISSAL
The trial court's finding that Ockey had no adequate remedy at law is the subject
of Lehmer's cross-appeal. ButLehmer completely fails to marshal evidence in support
of the finding. That failure alone is dispositive of Lehmer's cross-appeal. See Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177.
In an effort to avoid the marshaling requirement, Lehmer now characterizes the
issue as whether "Mr. Ockey first had ... to show a remedy at law was unavailable before
13 See Ockey's Opening Brief at37-39.
IMAI filed its own cross-appeal on the same issue but does not address it.
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the equitable remedy [he] sought was appropriate." Lehmer's Opening Brief'at 36.15
However characterized, the issue has a factual component. The question is whether the
trial court correctly found that the IMAI stock could not be valued with the requisite
degree of certainty. The evidence supporting the finding came from several sources. For
example, Lehmer, who owns approximately 23.5% of the company, testified there is no
market for the stock, he does not know its value and, at least indirectly, the value of the
stock depends on how well the underlying real estate development performs. (TT 106)
Alexandra Ockey owns 13.26% of the IMAI stock. (TT 520-21) She could not put
a value on it, but agreed that its value was dependent on the success of the development
efforts. (TT 521) Keith Kelly, one of the developer's principals, testified that the amount
IMAI would receive as its share of the development proceeds "will depend on a couple of
different factors, both of which at this point are uncertain, ultimate revenue and ultimate
costs...." (TT 795) Mr. Kelly identified many variables which will affect revenue and
costs in unknown ways. (TT 795-806) Lehmer argues Ockey "presented no evidence
15 In his Docketing Statement, Lehmer correctly characterized the issue as a question of
fact.
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that the IMAI stock could not be valued...," but he ignores the record.16 Id. at 37. The
Court should affirm the trial court's finding on the lack of a legal remedy.
Dated this 5th day ofApril 2007.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
ERIC P. LEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Scott Ockey
Lehmer also speculates, without support, that Ockey "chose to waive his right to
damages not because they were impossible to calculate, but because the calculation did
not result in a large damage award." Lehmer's OpeningBriefat 37. The truth is Ockey
retained and designated an experienced and recognized expert to address the valuation
issue. The expert determined that the stock could not be valued with any reasonable
degree of certainty, mandating the equitable remedy election. (TT 1021)
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